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Abstract— The average conditional entropy of the key given
the message and its corresponding cryptogram, H(K|M,C),
which is reffer as a key appearance equivocation, was proposed
as a theoretical measure of the strength of the cipher system
under a known-plaintext attack by Dunham in 1980. In the
same work (among other things), lower and upper bounds
for H(SM|MLCL) are found and its asymptotic behaviour
as a function of cryptogram length L is described for simple
substitution ciphers i.e. when the key space SM is the symmetric
group acting on a discrete alphabet M. In the present paper we
consider the same problem when the key space is an arbitrary
subgroup K ⊳ SM and generalize Dunham’s result.
Index Terms— key appearance equivocation, substituion ci-
phers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Shannon in his seminal paper [2] showed that the condi-
tional entropies of the key and message given the cryptogram
can be used as a theoretical measure of strength of the cipher
system when assuming unlimited cryptanalytic computational
capabilities. These conditional entropies are called the key and
message equivocation, respectively.
In general it is diffucult to calculate these equivocations
explicitly. For that Shannon established in [2] a general
lower bound and introduced a random cipher model which
would approximate the behaviour of complex practical ciphers.
Afterward, Hellman [3] reviewed and extended Shannon’s
information-theoretic approach and showed that random cipher
model is conservative in that a randomly chosen cipher is
essentially the worst possible. Later on Blom [4] obtained
exponentially tight bounds on the key equivocation for simple
substitution ciphers. In [1] to derive bounds for simple substi-
tution ciphers on the message equivocation in terms of the key
equivocation, Dunham derived such bounds for so-called key
appearance equivocation. This author pointed out also, that
it can be considered as a theoretical measure of the strength
of the cipher system under known-plaintext attack. Another
contribution of this subject is the Sgarro’s work [5].
In Section II we give the necessary background and state
a theorem which gives the bounds on the key appearance
equivocation for substitution ciphers when the key space is
confined to a subgroup K of the group SM of all substitutions
of a discrete alphabet M. In Section III we discuss four
applications of the stated theorem in some particular cases.
Finally, we conclude in Section IV.
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II. LOWER AND UPPER BOUNDS FOR THE KEY
APPEARANCE EQUIVOCATION
For basic definitions and notions we reffer to [2],[1] and
[6]. Let a memoryless message source with a discrete finite
alphabet M = {1, 2, . . . , N} be given. The probability of a
symbol n is denoted by PM(n). The cryptogram alphabet C
is taken to be the same as M, and the key space is K ⊳ SM
– an arbitrary subgroup of the the symmetric group acting on
M. For every π ∈ K the cryptographic transformation Tpi :
ML → ML is determined in the following way: If mL =
m1m2 . . .mL is a message of length L, then the cryptogram is
c
L = Tpi(m
L)
def
= π(m1)π(m2) . . . π(mL). We assume also
that the key and message sources are independent, and the
keys are equiprobable, i.e. PK(π) = 1/|K|.
We make use of the following lemma:
Lemma 2.1: Let G be a group of substitutions of the finite
set X . If the set G(i, j) = {π ∈ G/π(i) = j}, where i and j
are some fixed elements of X , is nonempty, then it is a left
coset by the stabilizer St(i) def= {τ ∈ G/τ(i) = i}.
Proof: Obviously, if π(i) ∈ G(i, j) then for any α ∈
St(i) we have π◦α(i) = π(i) = j. Conversely, if π(i) = j and
τ(i) = j then π−1 ◦τ(i) = π−1(j) = i hence π−1◦τ ∈ St(i).
In order to state the main theorem we need the following
definitions:
DEFINITION 2.2: The set F (π) def= {j/π(j) = j} is called
a fixed set of π ∈ K.
Let us denote by K∗ the set of all substitutions in K
excluding the identity.
DEFINITION 2.3: The key π ∈ K∗ is called maximal when
its fixed set F (π) is maximal in sense of inclusion among the
sets F (τ), τ ∈ K∗.
We will denote by Kmax the set of all maximal keys and for
any π ∈ Kmax by Ppi the sum of probablities
∑
j∈F (pi) PM(j).
For completeness of exposition we recall the defintion of
key appearance equivocation:
DEFINITION 2.4:
H(K|MLCL)
def
=
∑
mL∈ML
∑
cL∈CL
H(K|mLcL)PMLCL(m
L
c
L)
and
H(K|mLcL)
def
=
∑
k:Tk(mL)=cL
PK(k)log(1/PK(k))
The following theorem is a generalization of the result ob-
tained in [1] on the behaviour of key appearance equivocation
for simple substitution ciphers as a function of cryptogram
length.
2Theorem 2.5: Under the above impossed assumptions, let
Kmax is nonempty and R = max{Pτ/τ ∈ Kmax}. Then the
following inequalities hold:
log(2)RL ≤ H(K|MLCL) ≤ log(|K|)|Kmax|R
L
Remark. The logarithms are taken for an arbitrary fixed base
depending on the unit of entropy measurement.
Proof: Starting from definition of conditional entropy,
using the fact that the keys are equiprobable and applying
Lemma2.1 we consecutively get:∑
mL∈ML
∑
cL∈CL
H(K|mLcL)PMLCL(m
L
c
L) =
∑
mL∈ML
∑
cL∈CL
log(|St(mL)|)PMLCL(m
L
c
L) =
∑
mL∈ML
log(|St(mL)|)
∑
cL∈CL
PMLCL(m
L
c
L) =
∑
mL∈ML
log(|St(mL)|)PML(m
L),
where St(mL) = {Tpi/Tpi(mL) = mL, π ∈ K} is the
stabilizer of message mL.
Clearly, if St(mL) 6= {e}, where e is identity, we have:
2 ≤ |St(mL)| ≤ |K|. Thus the following inequalities hold:
log(2)
∑
mL:St(mL) 6={e}
PML(m
L) ≤ H(K|MLCL) ≤
log(|K|)
∑
mL:St(mL) 6={e}
PML(m
L) (1)
The fact that the message source is memoryless implies for
any Ω ⊂M and (m1m2 . . .mL) = mL ∈ ΩL
∑
mL
PML(m
L) =
∑
mL
L∏
l=1
PM(ml)
= (
∑
m∈Ω
PM(m))
L
Let R = Ppi . Since Tpi ∈ St(mL) for any mL ∈ [F (π)]L
then [F (π)]L ⊂ {mL ∈ ML/St(mL) 6= {e}}. Therefore the
following inequality holds:
RL = (
∑
m∈F (pi)
PM(m))
L =
∑
mL∈[F (pi)]L
PML(m
L) ≤
∑
mL:St(mL) 6={e}
PML(m
L) (2)
On the other hand, if for some mL, St(mL) 6= {e} holds,
then there exists a maximal key τ such that mL ∈ [F (τ)]L.
Therefore we have:∑
mL:St(mL) 6={e}
PML(m
L) ≤
∑
τ∈Kmax
∑
mL∈[F (τ)]L
PML(m
L) =
∑
τ∈Kmax
(Pτ )
L ≤ |Kmax|R
L (3)
From (2) and (3) substituting in (1), we finally obtain:
log(2)RL ≤ H(K|MLCL) ≤ log(|K|)|Kmax|R
L
which is the desired result.
Note that Theorem2.5 shows the asymptotic tight exponen-
tial behaviour of H(K|MLCL) with exponent base R equal
to the maximum among sums of symbol probabilities of the
fixed sets of maximal keys.
III. APPLICATIONS
We shall consider four applications of Theorem2.5. For the
first two applications we assume without loss of generality
that PM(1) ≥ PM(2) ≥ . . . ≥ PM(N).
1. Let K = SM – the case of simple substitution cipher.
Clearly, maximal keys are the transpositions. Therefore, R1 =∑N−2
j=1 PM(j) = 1 − PM(N) − PM(N − 1), |K| = N ! and
|Kmax| =
(
N
2
)
. This result is obtained in [1].
2. let K = AM, where AM is the alternating group acting
on M. It can be easily seen that maximal keys are the
substitutions which can be represented as a superposition of
cycle of length 3 and disjoint to this cycle identity substitution.
Clearly, these substitutions belong to A∗M. Proceeding as in
the previous case we get R2 =
∑N−3
j=1 PM(j) = 1−PM(N)−
PM(N − 1)− PM(N − 2), |K| = N !/2 and |Kmax| =
(
N
3
)
.
3. Let d be a positive integer. We will consider messages
of length L = kd, k ≥ 1. Since the message source is
memoryless it is memoryless also over the cartesian product
Md considered as an alphabet.
Let π ∈ S∆, where ∆ = {1, 2, . . . , d}. Define a
mapping Tpi : Md → Md as Tpi(m1m2 . . .md)
def
=
mpi(1)mpi(2) . . .mpi(d). Since π is a substitution, it follows that
Tpi is a substitution of Md. The set {Tpi/π ∈ S∆} with
superposition operation is a group isomorphic to S∆ and it
is a subgroup of SMd .
Furthermore it is well known that any π ∈ S∗∆ can be
represented as a superposition of disjoint cycles in a unique
way to the order of multipliers. A partition of ∆ corresponds
to this representation and it is not dificult to see that the fixed
set F (Tpi) consists of exactly those md ∈Md whose letters in
numbered places belonging to the same subset of the partition
of ∆, coincide. Therefore, if we take ρ ∈ S∗∆ different from π
such that the partition of ∆ detrmined by ρ is ”more detailed”,
then the inclusion F (Tpi) ⊂ F(Tρ) holds. The latter shows
that those Tpi are maximal for which π is represented as a
superposition of one cycle of length 2 and disjoint to this
cycle identity substitution, i.e. π is a transposition.
Taking into account the above considerations it can be easily
computed the rate R3 =
∑N
j=1 P
2
M(j), the order of subgroup
|K| = d! and the number of the maximal keys |Kmax| =
(
d
2
)
3for this case. Finally, we note that inequalities of Theorem2.5
now become:
log(2)Rk3 ≤ H(K|M
kd
C
kd) ≤ log(d!)
(
d
2
)
Rk3
4. Let now, the alphabet M be a finite field with |M| = N ,
where N is a power of prime number. Let K be the group of
affine transformations
g : y = ax+ b; a, b ∈M, a 6= 0
Obviously, each affine transformation y = ax + b, a 6= 1
possesses just one fixed point xf = b/(1 − a) and when
b runs through M the same does xf . Moreover translations
y = x + b, b 6= 0 do not possess any fixed points. Thus, we
have R4 = max{PM(n)/n ∈ M}, |K| = N(N − 1) and
|Kmax| = N(N − 2).
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Despite that during the past three decades mainly compu-
tational aspects of cryptology have been developped, there is
still place for information-theoretic investigations. An example
in this direction is the theorem from the present paper which
justifies mathematically the intuitive understanding that the
recovery of the key in known-plaintext attack on substitution
ciphers is more difficult when this key possesses many fixed
points.
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